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1. Introduction 
 
Possible useful applications of the blockchain technology are currently among the most 
discussed topics in the financial industry. So far, the only use of bigger scale is the origination 
of crypto currencies like its archetype Bitcoin. But this currencies have not played a significant 
role for payment transactions right now, remaining a niche for technology enthusiasts and 
highly volatile speculative objects. As a result, Bitcoin and its successors have not played a role 
for monetary policy theory, either. 
That situation may have changed after social network Facebook announced the intention 
to issue a digital currency named Libra in mid-June 2019.1 Two aspects suggests, that Libra can 
overcome the niche status and gain some significance for consumers and companies. At first, 
the prospect to serve 2.2 billion active Facebook users worldwide is a strong incentive for the 
profit-oriented member companies of the Libra Association to establish applications.2 Further-
more, the fact that Libra is planned as a “stable coin” speaks in favour of a good acceptance of 
Libra or similar projects by private households and companies. The blockchain technology is 
only used for documentation purposes, but unlike existing crypto currencies, there will be no 
limitation in the issue of Libra. Instead a collateralization with conventional currencies is 
planned, which will be explained in greater detail in section two. The decisive point is that price 
volatility caused by scarcity and speculation as a major disadvantage of existing crypto curren-
cies should vanish.  
In face of the probable new baseline it seems necessary to gain some fundamental un-
derstanding of the implications that the introduction of an international digital currency might 
bring for the monetary sphere. Dealing with an outstanding novel aspect implicates, that some 
of the following contemplations remain comparatively basic and contain speculative assump-
tions. Only practice can show whether they really apply. But the cursory explorations are also 
legitimated by the possible high relevance of the topic. 
The need for a fundamental assessment can also be seen by the vague and contradicting 
statements of central banks and its representatives. For example, the Deutsche Bundesbank re-
cently published an article, dealing in great detail with the blockchain technology in the finan-
cial sector.3 It is noteworthy that the Bundesbank avoids speaking of crypto or digital currencies 
                                                          
1 Libra Association (2019): An Introduction to Libra. White Paper. From the Libra Association Members. 
2 The founding members of Libra Associations include important companies like Ebay, Visa and Mastercard. 
3 Deutsche Bundesbank (2019): Krypto-Token im Zahlungsverkehr und in der Wertpapierabwicklung, in: Mo-
natsbericht Juli 2019, 39-60. 
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and instead uses the rather unusual term "crypto token". This is apparently to make clear that 
Bitcoin, Libra and similar approaches are only seen as a kind of voucher or club money, but not 
as a currency. Later, Burkhard Balz, member of the board of directors of the Bundesbank, pre-
dicted in an interview that Libra will not play a significant role in industrialized countries in the 
medium term.4 But Libra could become relevant for emerging countries and could have a cer-
tain disciplining effect on them. On the other hand, the President of the Swiss National Bank, 
Thomas Jordan, warned that Libra could impose a threat to the swiss monetary policy,5 hence 
the monetary policy of a well developed, industrialized country. 
The objective of this discussion paper is to give answers to the implied questions: Which 
countries could be affected by the introduction of Libra or another international digital currency 
with similar construction features, and, not less important, how will they be affected? For this 
purpose, following up, the expected behavior of private economic agents and their motives are 
specified. The third section of this paper contains a summary of the supposed reaction patterns. 
Section four is dedicated to possible conflicts with national monetary policies. As it will be 
shown, the introduction of an international digital currency can imply far-reaching conse-
quences for central banks in different ways. A small approach to assess the vulnerability of 
national currencies is presented in the fifth section. The sixth chapter presents the results and 
the seventh part finally sums up the characteristics of vulnerable currencies. 
 
 
2. Motives for use of an international digital currency and currency characteristics 
 
The Libra Association stated its intended introduction of a digital currency with the aim of 
giving people in developing countries with only limited access to financial services a low-cost 
option for money transfers.6 But in light of the broad spectrum of profit-oriented partner com-
panies and the global strategy of Facebook as the driving force behind Libra, the creation of 
applications for international use and also for national markets in developed countries can be 
expected. Pioneer costumers could include migrant workers who regularly transfer money to 
                                                          
4 Michael Rasch/Neue Zürcher Zeitung (2019): „Libra könnte stabiler sein als manche Währungen in den 
Schwellenländern“, https://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/libra-koennte-stabiler-sein-als-manche-waehrungen-in-den-
schwellenlaendern-ld.1504355 
5 Thomas Fuster/Neue Zürcher Zeitung (2019): SNB-Präsident Thomas Jordan warnt: Libra könnte die Wirk-
samkeit der Schweizer Geldpolitik beeinträchtigen, https://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/facebook-geld-libra-snb-prae-
sident-jordan-warnt-vor-auswirkungen-ld.1506748 
6 Libra Association (2019), 1-2. 
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relatives in their home countries and private households who buy in abroad online shops. If 
more and more opportunities arise to pay domestically, the use of the digital currency is likely 
to gradually expand. It will increasingly make sense not only to exchange money from national 
currency into an international digital currency for certain transactions, but also to have a con-
tinuous credit balance in it and, if applicable, to accept payments in this currency.7 The first and 
closest motive for using digital currencies as some store of value is therefore convenience in 
everyday payment transactions. This type of deposit can have a monetary policy effect if pay-
ment transactions increasingly take place outside the systems operated and monitored by central 
banks.8 However, this presumably creeping effect, will not be discussed further below. 
Even more important for monetary policy could be situations in which economic units 
can make conscious choices between their national conventional currency and an international 
digital currency. This is possible in different situations and for different reasons. 
A first plausible and drastic example are countries with acute currency devaluation. Sav-
ers get a reason to commit capital flight at least temporarily. Strong devaluations of local cur-
rencies do not only mean a loss of purchasing power abroad. They are often accompanied by 
higher inflation rates, hence a decline in domestic purchasing power.9 In future, savers will have 
the convenient opportunity to avoid the expected loss of purchasing power in these situations 
by transferring their money into an international digital currency. If the use of it will have be-
come ordinary for day-to-day payment transactions, there will be even advantages over typical 
safe haven-currencies like the U.S. dollar or the Swiss franc: The deposit in a digital currency 
can be gradually consumed later, so that a costly re-change into the home currency is not nec-
essary. Secure storage is also likely to be cheaper than hoarding foreign notes. In addition, there 
are fewer access hurdles because of transactions via the Internet. To sum it up, an international 
digital currency will cut the transaction costs for capital flight. 
Further situations than the drastic example of an acute currency crisis are imaginable 
which could make an international digital currency attractive for private households. This is the 
case if the national currency is expected to depreciate only slightly but continuously. The higher 
                                                          
7 In a statement published in mid-August 2018, the tax administration of New Zealand permitted salary payments 
in crypto currencies under certain conditions. 
8 Reference is also made to this by Deutsche Bundesbank (2019), 57. 
9 For example, from early 2014 to late 2015, the Russian rouble depreciated by 66% against the US dollar, with 
consumer prices rising 25 % within this time. In 2018, the Argentine peso and Turkish lira depreciated by 51% 
and 28%, respectively, with consumer price increases of 48% and 20%, respectively. Own calculations based on 
data from FRED Economic Data - St. Louis Fed. 
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the share of demand for consumer goods that is covered abroad, the more unpleasant a chronic 
depreciation might be. Additionally speculative holdings could become lucrative. 
The suitability of an international digital currency as an alternative store of value is 
basically determined by its construction features. They lead to the fact that Libra and possible 
similar approaches are not merely payment tokens as claimed by the Bundesbank. It is true that 
the Libra Association does not want to pursue a monetary policy.10 But private households and 
companies could perceive Libra as a fully-fledged currency for two reasons. 
First, there will be some kind of a flexible exchange rate, which usually does not exist 
for vouchers or club money. The Libra Association will use the received capital from Libra 
holders to form a reserve or rather to collateralize its digital currency. Therefore, the reserve 
can be described as a currency basket. The value of one unit in the digital currency measured 
in a specific national currency will result from the exchange rate development of this currency 
compared to the currencies in the reserve. If savers expect a depreciation of their national cur-
rency against this basket, it may be advantageous to transfer money into the international digital 
currency. 
Second, even if there the assumption of a stable exchange rate between the national and 
the digital currency prevails, a transfer of deposits to an international digital currency can be 
attractive. This is the case if savers expect the real interest rate on deposits in the digital currency 
to be higher than on deposits in their national currency. 
Before proceeding with that aspect, different possible features of the considered digital 
currency must be taken into consideration. The Libra Association stated that it will not pay 
interest or dividends for deposits in its digital currency.11 However, it is likely that inflation will 
also occur in the digital currency. Therefore, the real return on deposits will usually be negative. 
Against this background, the interest motive described above may apply only if nominal interest 
rates for deposits in the national currency are close to zero or negative. This will depend, of 
course, on different inflation rates in both currencies and on interest sensitivity of savers, too. 
Conversely, the interest motive is not applicable as long as deposits in the national currency 
will generate some interest payments and therefore compensate at least for parts of inflation 
losses. Overall, the result would be an asymmetric reaction pattern of capital owners. 
                                                          
10 Libra Association (2019), 7; Libra Association/Christian Catalini et. al. (2019): The Libra Reserve, 4. 
11 Libra Association (2019), 7; Libra Association/Christian Catalini et. al. (2019), 1ff. At the same time, no nega-
tive interest rates are planned. 
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The establishment of an international debt market in the new currency would change 
this baseline. As a consequence, an interest rate for loans and the possibility of interest pay-
ments on deposits would emerge. The asymmetry described above would be eliminated and 
deposits in the digital currency could be more attractive even when deposits in the national 
currency enable a positive, but smaller yield. 
In general, an international digital currency can be an alternative store of value for savers 
depending on exchange rate developments as well as differences between real yields. 
But this is not the end of possible implications. If there will be a debt market in the 
international currency, the perspective of borrowers must be considered, too. In this case, both 
motives described above must be seen in reverse. If borrowers expect a lower level of real 
interest rates in their national currency, they will tend to borrow in that currency. In contrast, if 
the real interest rate level in the national currency is higher, the international digital currency 
appears to be more advantageous for borrowing. Expectations regarding exchange rate devel-
opments must also be taken into account. If a borrower is expecting the national currency to 
depreciate under otherwise identical circumstances, he or she is likely to opt for debt in this 
currency and vice versa.12 
 
 
3. Reaction patterns at a glance 
 
The expected reaction patterns described above can be summarized as follows: The behavior 
of economic agents is influenced by two factors: first, expectations regarding real interest rate 
differentials between the national currency and the international digital currency, and second, 
expectations regarding the development of the exchange rate. Since two different variants are 
possible for each aspect, the result is a matrix with four possibilities, which is shown in the 
schematic below. 
 
                                                          
12 In practice, however, liquidity risks would have to be taken into account. The freedom of choice for private 
households and companies is increased if they reliably receive payments in both, in conventional and in digital 
currency, thus securing interest and principal payments. 
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Schematic 1: Expected reaction patterns of economic agents 
 
 
 Source:  Own draft. 
 
 
If expectations among savers prevail that their national currency will offer a higher real interest 
rate and will appreciate against the international digital currency, they will have a strong incen-
tive to retain their national currency as a store of value. The situation shown in field (A) will be 
also an incentive for borrowers to incur debt in the digital currency if a credit market has de-
veloped. Exactly the opposite is true in field (D). If the digital currency is likely to generate 
higher real interests and at the same time there is an expectation of an appreciation for it, then 
its attractiveness for savers increases, while borrowers are likely to prefer the national currency. 
For the two fields (B) and (C), the effects of the two aspects are contradictory. If the 
wealth effect of a higher real interest rate in the international digital currency is expected to be 
eliminated by its devaluation (field (B)), then both currencies should at least theoretically be 
equally attractive for savers and borrowers. The same would apply in the opposite case if a 
higher real interest rate in the national currency is offset by its devaluation (field (C)). In prac-
tice, however, either the real interest rate motive or the exchange rate motive could predominate 
for economic agents, depending on transaction costs and competition on capital markets. The 
nature and extent of the reactions are therefore unclear. 
The expected reaction patterns of savers and borrowers have implications for national 
financial markets. The characteristic of field (A) would ceteris paribus be a high supply of sav-
ings combined with weak demand for credit. In field (D), on the other hand, a weaker supply 
of capital would be expected locally, but the demand for credit would tend to stay high. 
 
 
Expectations of National currency appreciates National currency depreciates
economic units against int. digital currency against int. digital currency
Real interest rate  (A) Borrowers increasingly use  (C) Contradictory effects.
higher in national        int. digital currency and        Extent of reactions unclear.
currency        savers retain nat. currency
Real interest rate  (B) Contradictory effects.  (D) Savers increasingly use int.
higher in international        Extent of reactions unclear.        digital currency and borrowers
digital currency        retain national currency.
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4. Currency competition and conflict with national monetary policy 
 
So far, central banks have largely enjoyed a monopoly in the creation of money supply. They 
can therefore align their monetary policy with their individual objectives of a certain inflation 
rate, employment level or exchange rate peg. Any undesirable effects of rising or falling central 
bank rates have so far had to be accepted by the economic agents. 
As described above, the proliferation of an international digital currency would make it 
easier for economic units to evade the undesirable consequences of monetary policy decisions. 
This becomes particularly clear in the case of savers, who can switch to the international digital 
currency in anticipation of lower real interest rates in their national currency. This would mean 
that the natural interest rate floor, the so-called "effective lower bound" ore “zero lower bound”, 
would no longer be influenced solely by private households' ability to hold cash. A digital cur-
rency might get a similar impact and could influence currently discussed approaches to deal 
with that problem.13 
Additionally, with a debt market in the international digital currency, borrowers could 
have a strong incentive to use this alternative if national monetary policy were to raise key 
interest rates. 
Due to the resulting currency competition, the establishment of an international digital 
currency ultimately leads to a reduced room for manoeuvre in monetary policy. If a central bank 
were to attempt to compensate for the diminishing impact of its policy decisions with stronger 
adjustments in its key interest rate, it would only increase the incentive for the affected borrow-
ers or savers to use the digital currency. 
Central banks must therefore reckon with a loss of significance. Under the new regime, 
it could become probable that monetary policy will be less oriented towards previous objec-
tives. Instead, interest rate setting may be more oriented towards keeping differences of real 
yields as low as possible and avoiding exchange rate movements as far as possible. The result 
could be an international convergence of monetary policy. Maybe this situation can best be 
compared with the monetary policy regime of the gold standard in the second half of the 19th 
century respectively at the beginning of the 20th century. At that time, the central banks had to 
                                                          
13 Katrin Assenmacher und Signe Krogstrup (2019): Monetary Policy with Negative Interest Rates: Decoupling 
Cash from Electronic Money, IMF Working Paper 18/191. 
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adjust their interest rates to maintain the indirectly fixed exchange rates due to the gold peg of 
the currencies. It was hardly possible to pursue domestic policy goals.14 
 
 
5. Empirical testing of the vulnerability of currencies 
 
So far, it is open to what extent the expected reaction patterns described above are relevant for 
practice. To give an answer, an empirical study with 42 currencies for which data is available 
will be carried out below. 
First, it is necessary to operationalize the two identified influencing factors. A particular 
hurdle is that there is no international digital currency that can be observed. Alternatively, a 
proxy must be used. Suitable for this purpose are special drawing rights (SDRs) of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), an artificial currency created in 1969 for transactions between 
central banks. It is constructed as a basket of currencies and thus resembles in its basic features 
the approach of an international digital currency. The exchange rate of the SDRs results from 
the exchange rate fluctuations of the participating national currencies. 
The SDR-basket currently contains only five currencies: the U.S. dollar, the Euro, the 
Japanese yen, the British pound and, since the beginning of October 2016, the Chinese renminbi 
yuan. In this respect there may be a difference to the intended digital currency Libra. Its reserve 
could be made up of significantly more currencies. In the case of Libra no concrete plans have 
yet been presented. However, since the five currencies in the SDR-basket play a very important 
role in international trade, it is likely that the exchange rate of the SDRs will come quite close 
to the performance of an international digital currency. 
A second hurdle in operationalisation is, as mentioned above, that reactions of economic 
agents depend on their own expectations. Although financial institutions make forecasts for 
exchange rates and interest rates, no time series on the expectations of private households and 
companies are available. Instead, only data on past exchange rate and real interest rate devel-
opments can be used. However, this is not a disadvantage. If it is assumed that economic agents 
                                                          
14 For the diffusion and the rules of the international gold standard see Peter Spahn (2001): From Gold to Euro: 
On Monetary Theory and the History of Currency Systems, Berlin a.o., 97ff. 
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do not have complete rational expectations, but only adaptive ones,15 then past developments 
can be used as estimates of future expectations. 
For expectations regarding the exchange rate development between the national cur-
rency and the international digital currency, the past exchange rate development between the 
national currencies and special drawing rights is considered. It seems suitable to observe several 
years. Therefore the average change in the exchange rate of a currency (∆𝑞𝑐) is calculated on 
the basis of calendar year changes in this currency (∆𝑞𝑡
𝑐) of a number of years (n). The five-
year period 2014 to 2018 will be considered.16 
 
            
 
The same procedure is used for the average absolute real interest rate of every particular cur-
rency (𝑟𝑐). The real interest rate for each calendar year is calculated by subtracting the con-
sumer price inflation for the respective period at the end of the year (𝜋𝑡
𝑐) from the key policy 
rate in force (𝑖𝑡
𝑐), i.e. the official interest rate or the most important interest rate of the respective 
central bank.17 
 
   
 
This approach leads only to a rough picture of reality for various reasons: consumer price indi-
ces are calculated using different methods in different currency areas and the composition of 
consumer baskets differs from one another.18 In addition, central banks make use of different 
                                                          
15 For the terms rational expectations and adaptive expectations see John F. Muth (1961): Rational Expectations 
and the Theory of Price Movements, in: Econometrica 29/3, 315-335; Peter Spahn (2009): Geldpolitik: Fi-
nanzmärkte, neue Makroökonomie und zinspolitische Strategien, 2. überarbeitete Auflage, München (2009), 106. 
16 The exchange rate trend is calculated on the basis of the exchange rate at the end of each calendar year. Data 
from the Bank for International Settlement and St. Louis Fed FRED Economic Data is used for this purpose. The 
exchange rates of the particular currencies to special drawing rights are calculated as cross rates using the ex-
change rates of the U.S. dollar. 
17 For consumer price inflation and the key policy rate, data from the Bank for International Settlement and the 
International Monetary Fund (World Economic Outlook Database April 2019) was used, as well as data from 
individual central banks in some cases. 
18 This can be easily demonstrated by the situation in Germany. The Statistisches Bundesamt publishes two con-
sumer price inflation rates: It calculates one figure according to the rules of the European Harmonized Index of 
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instruments as key policy rates. In some currency areas only very short-term money market 
rates are managed, while in others short- to medium-term rates are in place.19 In addition, some 
instruments are more focused on refinancing activities of commercial banks and others on cap-
ital markets.20 For this reason, and due to different levels of competition in the financial sector, 
even in currency areas with identical key interest rates, different nominal interest rates may 
exist for economic units.21 However, these deficits in the calculation of real interest rate devel-
opments have to be accepted due to the lack of internationally perfectly comparable data.22 
Second, it would be useful to make two observations for each currency, since the market interest 
rate for savers is usually below the key interest rate and the market interest rate for borrowers 
is above it. However, there are again restrictions with regard to data availability, so that for 
simplification only the key policy rate will be used. 
 
 
6. Presentation of the evaluation results 
 
As a result of the calculations presented in section 5, there are two metrics for each currency. 
They are included in Table A1 in the appendix. The results can also be presented graphically. 
The basic structure of Table 1 above is used for this purpose. This means that the expected 
exchange rate development determines the horizontal position. The past average exchange rate 
(∆𝑞𝑐) is used for this purpose. On the other hand, the expected development of the real interest 
rate, expressed by the past average real interest rate (𝑟𝑐), determines the vertical position. 
 
                                                          
Consumer Prices and another according to a national method. Both numbers often deviates from each other con-
siderably. For example, in July 2019 the Bundesamt reported an increase in consumer prices of 1.1% year-on-
year according to European rules and of 1.7% according to national rules. 
19 For example, the Czech central bank uses a 2-week repo rate and the Indonesian central bank a 7-day reverse 
repo rate. In China, the 1-Year lending rate is the key policy rate. 
20 An example for affecting a money market rate is the Federal Reserve System. In the United States a target 
band for the Federal Funds Rate is used. The European Central Bank, on the other hand, directly influences the 
refinancing costs of commercial banks by allocating central bank money by main refinancing operations and tar-
geted long-term refinancing operations. 
21 There is a mentionable difference for the People's Republic of China, where the 1-year benchmark lending rate 
is officially considered the key policy rate (currently 4.35%), while the deposit rate for savers is significantly 
lower (currently 1.5%). This must be taken into account when interpreting the results. 
22 A further simplification is the use of the key policy rate at the end of the year, which does not take account of 
changes within each year. 
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Chart 1: Observed currencies by development of their exchange rate against Special Drawing 
  Rights (SDRs) and real yield 2014-2018 
 
 
 Source:  Own calculation according to formula (1) and (2) based on data of the Bank for International 
Settlements, International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database April 2019,  
St. Louis Fed FRED Economic Data, Central Banks. See also table A1 in the appendix. 
 Note: Not plotted in the graph because outside the display area are ARS, BRL, COP, RUB, 
TRY and UAH. See table A1 in the appendix for details. 
 
 
The four fields (A), (B), (C) and (D) in the graphic above result from the transfer of the ar-
rangement according to Table 1. The common characteristic of the currencies in field (A) is the 
appreciation against SDRs on average for the calendar years 2014 to 2018, as well as a calcu-
lated positive real interest rate in this period. Currencies from East Asia and the Middle East 
are particularly affected. With respect to the figures used here, there are no incentives for savers 
to prefer SDRs or a similarly structured international digital currency for investments. At the 
same time, borrowers could have improved their situation by using the alternative currency, if 
possible. For that reason, the introduction of an international digital currency would make it 
more difficult for the central banks of these countries to implement a restrictive monetary policy 
if needed. 
For the few currencies in field (B), the U.S. dollar, the Hong Kong dollar and the Japa-
nese yen, the result is basically ambiguous. The negative real interest rate is combined with an 
appreciation against SDRs. Ideally, both effects neutralize each other from the perspective of 
savers and borrowers. As a result there is no reason for a currency flight by domestic residents. 
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The same applies in principle to field (C). However, here for some currencies the posi-
tive real interest rate can only compensate to a small extent the average depreciation. For Na-
mibia, South Africa, Mexico and Uruguay, for example, the average depreciation of their cur-
rencies reached between 5.3% and 6.7% per year, with a calculated real interest rate of only 
1.1% to 1.4% per year. It may therefore appear attractive for savers to prefer a capital invest-
ment in an international digital currency over the national currency. That is even more signifi-
cant for the Russian rouble, the Brazilian real and the Argentine and Colombian pesos, which 
depreciated between just under 10% and 42% per year and are therefore not shown in the chart 
above. 
Field (D) contains currencies that depreciated against SDRs in recent years and would 
therefore probably have depreciated against an international digital currency. At the same time, 
they had a negative real interest rate for this period. The establishment of an international digital 
currency implicates that borrowers in such constellations will continue to prefer the national 
currency. In contrast, savers have a strong incentive to use the digital currency, depending on 
the transaction costs. It is therefore risky for central banks of these countries to implement an 
expansive monetary policy if necessary. 
As explained above, generally two different cases are possible for the yield motive, de-
pending on whether a debt market in the international digital currency originated or not. For 
that reason, actually two divergent consideration have to been made. The presented calculations 
aimed at the absolute real interest rate level of each currency and thus represent the case without 
debt market.23 The horizontal demarcation between the four fields in the above chart was drawn 
at a real interest rate of 0.00% with line b). If, on the other hand, a capital market originated, 
then the real interest rate level of the national currencies would have to be considered in relation 
to the real interest rate level of the international digital currency, respectively here to SDRs. A 
notional real interest rate level of minus 0.83 % can be calculated for SDRs in the period 2014 
to 2018.24 This negative value shifts the horizontal boundary slightly downwards. It is shown 
with the dotted line b') in the diagram. 
Despite the resulting reduction in the size of the quadrant, some currencies remain in 
field (D). These include the British pound, which was burdened above all by the Brexit problem. 
                                                          
23 The contemplations on the behavior of borrowers made here would be obsolete in this case. 
24 This value is derived from the respective key policy rate of the central banks of the currencies included, taking 
into account their weight in the currency basket less a notional inflation rate for Special Drawing Rights. The 
second was calculated using the consumer price indices of the currencies in the basket, the respective weights 
and the formula of Paasche. Slightly different numbers would result from the use of other methods. 
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In addition, the Swedish and Norwegian crown in particular have shown a remarkably low level 
of real interest rates over the past five years, while the external value has sunken at the same 
time. This applies to an even greater extent only to Turkey and Ukraine, which experienced 
currency crises as a result of political events and which could not be shown in the chart. 
Interestingly, the Swiss franc is the currency which, according to the calculation method 
applied, has been the most similar to SDRs in the last five years.25 Compared to all other coun-
tries, Switzerland's monetary policy would have been least restricted by the introduction of an 
international digital currency. 
 
 
7. Structural characteristics of vulnerable currencies 
 
The distribution of currencies among the four fields is not random. Rather, it seems to follow 
certain patterns that depend on the structural characteristics of the countries and their curren-
cies. This observation allows general conclusions to be drawn. For example, the fields (A) and 
(C) with positive real interest rates contain almost exclusively currencies of developing and 
newly industrialized countries, including some with Currency Board. In contrast, fields (B) and 
(D) are almost exclusively occupied by the currencies of developed countries. 
This classification is probably due to two reasons. First, the governments of developed 
economies tend to have better credit ratings. This results into a lower yield level of government 
bonds on international capital markets. Apparently, this in turn affects the general interest rate 
level in these countries and thus also the environment for interest rate decisions by central 
banks.26 Second, especially in developed economies, the long-term neutral interest rate may be 
lower than in emerging markets due to the lower rates of real economic growth.27 
Irrespective of whether these explanation approaches are correct, the visible link be-
tween the stage of development of an economy and its place in one of the four fields is likely 
to pose new challenges for some central banks. In developing countries with typically higher 
rates of economic growth and higher inflation, there may be more often a need for a restrictive 
                                                          
25 The position of the special drawing rights in the diagram corresponds to the intersection of lines a) and b'). 
26 In this respect, the empirical findings point to an aspect that usually does not play a role in monetary policy 
theory. For the close relationship between rating and real interest rate level, see Chart A1 in the appendix. For 
the Taylor rule as the common explanatory approach for the key interest rate level, see Spahn (2009), 213ff. 
27 An up-to-date compilation of current estimates for the low neutral real rate of interest for the United States of 
America can be found in the online appendix of a speech by Jerome H. Powell (2019): Challenges for Monetary 
Policy, Jackson Hole, Wyoming. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20190823a.htm 
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monetary policy. But an international digital currency would limit the chances of their imple-
mentation. On the opposite, central banks in developed countries have tended to have a greater 
need to support economic growth with a more accommodative monetary policy in recent years. 
Low inflation rates allowed very low interest rates. Here, an international digital currency 
would limit the positive effects of easing measures, since savers could react with capital flight. 
The results of the evaluation permit a second prediction: As central banks with a need 
for easing can only conduct their monetary policy to a limited extent while other central banks 
are prevented from implementing a more restrictive monetary policy, an international conver-
gence of monetary policy could result, as already explained in section four.28 So far, clusters of 
geographically neighbouring currency areas can be identified easily in chart 1 through their 
small graphical distance.29 Monetary policy in neighbouring countries appears to influence the 
national real interest rate and exchange rate development. The establishment of an international 
digital currency and the associated greater integration of the capital markets suggests that these 
clusters will converge. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
An international digital currency like Libra would lack some features of existing currencies, for 
example a central bank with its own monetary policy. But if the digital currency is covered by 
a reserve of conventional currencies and its exchange rate results from the development of this 
currency basket, it appears as an individual currency from the perspective of consumers and 
companies and not just like a payment token. Depending on the degree of use, transaction costs, 
sensitivity of economic agents and the establishment of a capital market in the digital currency, 
an alternative would emerge for savers and possibly for borrowers. This would eliminate the 
money supply monopoly of national central banks, which has so far offered them great freedom 
in implementing their monetary policy. 
The above evaluation of 42 currencies in conjunction with the assumptions made about 
the behavior of savers and borrowers reveals the nature and scope of risks. In countries with 
above-average real interest rates and appreciating currencies, especially in newly industrialized 
                                                          
28 If monetary policy cannot adapt to current conditions in the respective country, an increase of frictions, caused 
by too high or too low interest rates could be the consequence. 
29 For example, in the Arab region SAR and BHD, in Asia INR and IDR, in Africa NAD and ZAR, in Latin 
America MXN and UYU and in Scandinavia SEK and NOK. 
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countries, the possibility of implementing a restrictive monetary policy will be reduced. In 
countries with comparatively low or negative real interest rates and with currencies that tend to 
depreciate, policy makers could lose the possibility of further easing. The natural interest rate 
floor, the "effective lower bound", can shift upwards. This could also generally reduce the cen-
tral banks' ability to have a dampening effect on the whole economic cycle. Moreover, an in-
ternational convergence of monetary policy can be expected. The introduction of an interna-
tional digital currency thus represents an important turning point for monetary policy. 
 
  
INTERNATIONAL DIGITAL CURRENCIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON MONETARY POLICY 
17 
 
References: 
 
Assenmacher, Katrin and Signe Krogstrup (2019): Monetary Policy with Negative Interest  
 Rates: Decoupling Cash from Electronic Money, IMF Working Paper 18/191. 
 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2019): Krypto-Token im Zahlungsverkehr und in der  
Wertpapierabwicklung, in: Monatsbericht Juli 2019, 39-60. 
 
Fuster, Thomas/Neue Zürcher Zeitung (2019): SNB-Präsident Thomas Jordan warnt: Libra  
könnte die Wirksamkeit der Schweizer Geldpolitik beeinträchtigen, 
https://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/facebook-geld-libra-snb-praesident-jordan-warnt-vor-
auswirkungen-ld.1506748 
 
Libra Association (2019): An Introduction to Libra. White Paper. From the Libra Association  
 Members. 
 
Libra Association/Christian Catalini et. al. (2019): The Libra Reserve. 
 
Muth, John F. (1961): Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements, in:  
Econometrica 29/3, 315-335. 
 
Powell, Jerome H. (2019): Challenges for Monetary Policy, Jackson Hole, Wyoming. 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20190823a.htm 
 
Rasch, Michael/Neue Zürcher Zeitung (2019): „Libra könnte stabiler sein als manche  
Währungen in den Schwellenländern“, https://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/libra-koennte-
 stabiler-sein-als-manche-waehrungen-in-den-schwellenlaendern-ld.1504355 
 
Spahn, Peter (2001): From Gold to Euro: On Monetary Theory and the History of Currency  
 Systems, Berlin a.o., 
 
Spahn, Peter (2009): Geldpolitik: Finanzmärkte, neue Makroökonomie und zinspolitische  
Strategien, 2. überarbeitete Auflage, München. 
 
 
 
Data Sources: 
 
Bank for International Settlements 
https://www.bis.org/statistics/index.htm 
 
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database April 2019 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/01/weodata/index.aspx 
 
St. Louis Fed FRED Economic Data 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/ 
 
Börsen-Zeitung 
 https://www.boersen-zeitung.de/index.php?li=312&subm=laender 
  
INTERNATIONAL DIGITAL CURRENCIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON MONETARY POLICY 
18 
 
Appendix 
 
Table A1: Results for observed currencies 
 
Sources: Own calculation based on data from International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook Database April  
     2019, Bank for International Settlements Statistics, St. Louis Fed FRED Economic Data, Central Banks 
Country Currency
Argentina Peso ARS 2,8 -41,6 B**
Australia Dollar AUD 0,1 -2,8 B
Bahrain Dinar BHD 1,2 1,9 A
Brazil Real BRL 4,5 -10,1 B**
Canada Dollar CAD -0,8 -3,2 D
Chile Peso CLP -0,2 -3,7 D
China (People's Republic) Renminbi Yuan* CNH 2,8 -0,5 B
Comobia Peso COP 0,6 -9,4 B**
Czech Republic Koruna CZK -0,8 -0,4 D
Denmark Crown DKK -0,4 -1,8 D
Eurozone Euro EUR -0,8 -1,5 D
Hong Kong Dollar HKD -1,5 1,7 C
Hungary Forint HUF 0,2 0,9 A
India Rupee INR 2,4 -0,4 B
Indonesia Rupiah IDR 1,9 -0,9 B
Israel New Shekel ILS 0,1 0,4 A
Japan Yen JPY -0,9 1,1 C
Malaysia Ringgit MYR 1,0 -2,6 B
Mexico Peso MXN 1,3 -6,5 B
Namibia Dollar NAD 1,4 -5,3 B
New Zealand Dollar NZD 1,1 -2,2 B
North Macedonia Denar MKD 2,8 -1,8 B
Norway Crown NOK -1,8 -5,5 D
Philippines Peso PHP 1,2 -1,4 B
Poland Zloty PLN 1,1 -2,6 B
Romania New Leu RON 1,1 -2,6 B
Russia Ruble RUB 3,6 -17,4 B**
Saudi Arabia Riyal SAR 1,2 1,9 A
Serbia Dinar RSD 2,7 -2,6 B
Singapore Dollar SGD 1,4 0,5 A
South Africa Rand ZAR 1,1 -5,3 B
South Korea Won KRW 0,4 0,9 A
Sweden Crown SEK -1,4 -4,7 D
Switzerland Franc CHF -0,6 0,0 C
Taiwan Dollar TWD 0,9 1,4 A
Thailand Baht THB 1,2 2,2 A
Turkey Lira TRY -1,2 -17,8 D**
Ukraine Hrywnja UAH -4,3 -28,3 D**
United Kingdom Pound GBP -1,0 -6,3 D
United States Dollar USD -0,5 2,2 C
Uruguay Peso UYU 1,2 -6,7 B
Vietnam Dong VND 1,8 0,1 A
* offshore    ** not plotted in graph due to graphic restrictions
Plotted
in
quadrant
ISO-code
currency real interest exchange rate change
Five-year average-
against SDRs in %rate in %
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Chart A1: Long term credit rating and real interest rate of 36 observed currencies 
 
 
 
Sources:  Own calculation based on data from International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook Database April 2019, 
Bank for International Settlements Statistics, St. Louis Fed FRED Economic Data, Central Banks, Börsen-Zeitung 
Note:  Not included are all currencies from the sample with a five-year average depreciation against special drawing rights 
of more than 8 %, i.e. those with currency crises (ARS, BRL, COP, RUB, TRY, UAH). 
 
 
 
R² = 0,5186
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 155
 y
e
a
r 
a
v
e
ra
g
e
 r
e
a
l i
n
te
re
st
 r
a
te
 in
 %
 (
)
long term credit rating S&P
AAA   AA+ AA    AA- A+      A      A- BBB+ BBB  BBB- BB+   BB    BB- B+   
Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences 
 
This paper series aims to present working results of researchers of all disciplines from the Faculty of Business, 
Economics and Social Sciences and their cooperation partners since 2015. 
 
Institutes 
 
510 Institute of Financial Management 
520 Institute of Economics 
530 Institute of Health Care & Public Management 
540 Institute of Communication Science 
550 Institute of Law and Legal Sciences 
560 Institute of Education, Labour and Society 
570 Institute of Marketing & Management 
580 Institute of Interorganizational Management & Performance 
 
Research Areas (since 2017) 
 
INEPA   “Inequality and Economic Policy Analysis” 
TKID   “Transformation der Kommunikation – Integration und Desintegration” 
NegoTrans  “Negotiation Research – Transformation, Technology, Media and Costs” 
INEF  “Innovation, Entrepreneurship and Finance” 
 
 
The following table shows recent issues of the series. A complete list of all issues and full texts are available on our 
homepage:  https://wiso.uni-hohenheim.de/papers 
 
No. Author Title Inst 
    
01-2018 Michael D. Howard 
Johannes Kolb 
 
FOUNDER CEOS AND NEW VENTURE MEDIA 
COVERAGE 
INEF 
02-2018 Peter Spahn UNCONVENTIONAL VIEWS ON INFLATION 
CONTRAOL: FORWARD GUIDANCE, THE NEO-
FISHERIAN APPROACH, AND THE FISCAL 
THEORY OF THE PRICE LEVEL 
 
520 
03-2018 Aderonke Osikominu 
Gregor Pfeifer 
 
PERCEIVED WAGES AND THE GENDER GAP IN 
STEM FIELDS 
INEPA 
04-2018 Theresa Grafeneder-
Weissteiner 
Klaus Prettner 
Jens Südekum 
 
THREE PILLARS OF URBANIZATION: MIGRATION, 
AGING, AND GROWTH 
INEPA 
05-2018 Vadim Kufenko 
Vincent Geloso 
Klaus Prettner 
 
DOES SIZE MATTER? IMPLICATIONS OF 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 
AND CONVERGENCE 
INEPA 
06-2018 Michael Trost THE WHOLE IS GREATER THAN THE SUM OF ITS 
PARTS – PRICING PRESSURE INDICES FOR 
MERGERS OF VERTICALLY INTEGRATED FIRMS 
 
520 
07-2018 Karsten Schweikert TESTING FOR COINTEGRATION WITH 
TRESHOLD ADJUSTMENT IN THE PRESENCE OF 
STRUCTURAL BREAKS 
 
520 
08-2018 Evanthia Fasoula 
Karsten Schweikert 
PRICE REGULATIONS AND PRICE ADJUSTMENT 
DYNAMICS: EVIDENCE FROM THE AUSTRIAN 
RETAIL FUEL MARKET 
 
520 
No. Author Title Inst 
    
09-2018 Michael Ahlheim 
Jan Neidhardt 
Ute Siepmann 
Xiaomin Yu 
 
WECHAT – USING SOCIAL MEDIA FOR THE 
ASSESSMENT OF TOURIST PREFERENCES FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS IN CHINA 
520 
10-2018 Alexander Gerybadze 
Simone Wiesenauer 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL SALES ACCELERATOR: A 
PROJECT MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR IMPROVING 
SALES PERFORMANCE IN FOREIGN TARGET 
MARKETS 
 
570 
11-2018 Klaus Prettner 
Niels Geiger 
Johannes Schwarzer 
 
DIE WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN FOLGEN DER 
AUTOMATISIERUNG 
INEPA 
12-2018 Martyna Marczak 
Thomas Beissinger 
COMPETITIVENESS AT THE COUNTRY-SECTOR 
LEVEL: NEW MEASURES BASED ON GLOBAL 
VALUE CHAINS 
 
520 
13-2018 Niels Geiger 
Klaus Prettner 
Johannes Schwarzer 
 
AUTOMATISIERUNG, WACHSTUM UND 
UNGLEICHHEIT 
INEPA 
14-2018 Klaus Prettner 
Sebastian Seiffert 
THE SIZE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS AND 
EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES: THEORY AND 
EVIDENCE FROM THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT 
 
INEPA 
15-2018 Marina Töpfer THE EFFECT OF WOMEN DIRECTORS ON 
INNOVATION ACTIVITY AND PERFORMANCE OF 
CORPORATE FIRMS 
- EVIDENCE FROM CHINA – 
 
INEF 
16-2018 Timo Walter TRADE AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF A 
POTENTIAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 
 
INEPA 
17-2018 Jonas Frank THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON 
TRADE: NEW EVIDENCE FROM A PANEL PPML 
GRAVITY APPROACH 
 
INEPA 
18-2018 Jonas Frank THE EFFECT OF CULTURE ON TRADE OVER 
TIME – NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE GLOBE DATA 
SET 
 
520 
19-2018 Dario Cords 
Klaus Prettner 
TECHNOLOGICAL UNEMPLOYMENT REVISITED: 
AUTOMATION IN A SEARCH AND MATCHING 
FRAMEWORK 
 
INEPA 
20-2018 Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer 
Andreas Neumayer 
 
THE PERSISTENCE OF OWNERSHIP INEQUALITY 
– INVESTORS ON THE GERMAN STOCK 
EXCHANGES, 1869-1945 
 
INEPA 
21-2018 Nadja Dwenger 
Lukas Treber 
 
SHAMING FOR TAX ENFORCEMENT: EVIDENCE 
FROM A NEW POLICY 
520 
22-2018 Octavio Escobar 
Henning Mühlen 
THE ROLE OF FDI IN STRUCTURAL CHANGE: 
EVIDENCE FROM MEXICO 
 
520 
 
 
No. Author Title Inst 
    
24-2018 Peng Nie 
Lanlin Ding 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
OBESITY INEQUALITY AND THE CHANGING 
SHAPE OF THE BODYWEIGHT DISTRIBUTION IN 
CHINA 
INEPA 
25-2018 Michael Ahlheim 
Maike Becker 
Yeniley Allegue Losada 
Heike Trastl 
 
WASTED! RESOURCE RECOVERY AND WASTE 
MANAGEMENT IN CUBA 
520 
26-2018 Peter Spahn WAS WAR FALSCH AM MERKANTILISMUS? 
 
520 
27-2018 Sophie Therese Schneider NORTH_SOUTH TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE 
QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS: PANEL DATA 
EVIDENCE 
 
INEPA 
    
01-2019 Dominik Hartmann 
Mayra Bezerra 
Beatrice Lodolo 
Flávio L. Pinheiro 
 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, DEVELOPMENT TRAPS, 
AND THE CORE-PERIPHERY STRUCTURE OF 
INCOME INEQUALITY 
 
INEPA 
02-2019 Sebastian Seiffert 
 
GO EAST: ON THE IMPACT OF THE 
TRANSIBERIAN RAILWAY ON ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN RUSSIA 
 
INEPA 
03-2019 Kristina Bogner KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS IN THE GERMAN 
BIOECONOMY: NETWORK STRUCTURE OF 
PUBLICLY FUNDED R&D NETWORKS 
 
520 
04-2019 Dominik Hartmann 
Mayra Bezerra 
Flávio L. Pinheiro 
 
IDENTIFYING SMART STRATEGIES FOR 
ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND INCLUSIVE 
GROWTH IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES. THE 
CASE OF PARAGUAY 
 
INEPA 
05-2019 Octavio Escobar 
Henning Mühlen 
 
DECOMPOSING A DECOMPOSITION: WITHIN-
COUNTRY DIFFERENCES AND THE ROLE OF 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN PRODUCTIVITY 
GROWTH 
 
INEPA 
06-2019 Dominik Hartmann 
Cristian Figueroa 
Mary Kaltenberg 
Paolo Gala 
 
MAPPING STRATIFICATION: THE INDUSTRY-
OCCUPATION SPACE REVEALS THE NETWORK 
STRUCTURE OF INEQUALITY 
INEPA 
07-2019 Stephan Fichtner 
Herbert Meyr 
 
BIOGAS PLANT OPTIMIZATION BY INCREASING 
ITS FLEXIBILITY CONSIDERING UNCERTAIN 
REVENUES 
 
580 
08-2019 Annika Lenz 
Muhammed Kaya 
Philipp Melzer 
Andreas Schmid 
Josepha Witt 
Mareike Schoop 
 
DATA QUALITY AND INFORMATION LOSS IN 
STANDARDISED INTERPOLATED PATH ANALYIS 
– QUALITY MEASURES AND GUIDELINES 
NegoTrans 
09-2019 Thilo R. Huning 
Fabian Wahl 
 
THE FETTERS OF INHERITANCE? 
EQUAL PARTITION AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
520 
 
10-2019 Peter Spahn KEYNESIAN CAPITAL THEORY, DECLINING 
INTEREST RATES AND PERSISTING PROFITS 
 
520 
11-2019 Thorsten Proettel INTERNATIONAL DIGITAL CURRENCIES 
AND THEIR IMPACT ON MONETARY 
POLICY – AN EXPLORATION OF 
IMPLICATIONS AND VULNERABILITY 
 
520 
 
IMPRINT
University of Hohenheim
Dean’s Office of the Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences
Palace Hohenheim 1 B
70593 Stuttgart | Germany
Fon +49 (0)711 459 22488
Fax +49 (0)711 459 22785
wiso@uni-hohenheim.de
wiso.uni-hohenheim.de
